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Abstract—Architectural debt is a form of technical debt that 
derives from the gap between the architectural design of the 
system as it “should be” compared to “as it is”. We measured ar- 
chitecture debt in two ways: 1) in terms of system-wide coupling 
measures, and 2) in terms of the number and severity of archi- 
tectural flaws. In recent work it was shown that the amount of 
architectural debt has a huge impact on software maintainability 
and evolution. Consequently, detecting and reducing the debt is 
expected to make software more amenable to change. This paper 
reports on a longitudinal study of a healthcare communications 
product created by Brightsquid Secure Communications Corp. 
This start-up company is facing the typical trade-off problem of 
desiring responsiveness to change requests, but wanting to avoid 
the ever-increasing effort that the accumulation of quick-and- 
dirty changes eventually incurs. In the first stage of the study, we 
analyzed the status of the “before” system, which indicated the 
impacts of change requests. This initial study motivated a more 
in-depth analysis of architectural debt. The results of this 
analysis were used to motivate a comprehensive refactoring of 
the software system. The third phase of the study was a follow- on 
architectural debt analysis which quantified the improvements 
made. Using this quantitative evidence, augmented by qualitative 
evidence gathered from in-depth interviews with Brightsquid’s 
architects, we present lessons learned about the costs and benefits 
of paying down architecture debt in practice. 
Index Terms—Architectural debt, Cost-benefit analysis, Lon- 
gitudinal study, Refactoring 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent research [9], [25] has shown that architectural design 
flaws accumulate in software projects over time, and that the 
accumulation of these flaws creates a specific kind of technical 
debt [2] that we call architectural debt. Architectural debt 
exists and grows because design flaws are easy to introduce 
unnoticed; they are introduced by the maintenance activities of 
programmers as they go about their “main” business of adding 
features and fixing bugs. These design flaws erode the quality 
of a software system and propagate bugginess among the 
system’s source files. These flawed structures have been 
shown to incur high maintenance penalties [6], [16]— 
increased numbers of bugs, increased numbers of changes, and 
consequently more lines of code committed and more effort. 
This additional effort is the interest that a project pays on 
the incurred debt. Removing these flaws requires effort, in the 
form of refactoring, and the benefits of refactoring have 
historically been difficult for architects and project managers 
to quantify or justify; they simply do not have the data and 
analytic tools available to quantify the costs and benefits of a 
proposed refactoring. For this reason, large-scale refactorings 
to remove debt are exceedingly rare. 
In this paper we report on the results of a longitudinal study 
at a company that produces secure communication software 
for health information. Brightsquid1 is a global provider of 
HIPAA-compliant2 communication solutions, providing com- 
pliant messaging and large file transfer for medical and dental 
professionals since 2009. Secure-Mail is Brightsquid’s core 
communication and collaboration platform. It offers role-based 
API access to a catalog of services and automated workflows. 
Their platform supports aggregating, generating, and sharing 
protected health information across communities of health care 
patients, practitioners, and organizations. Brightsquid has been 
working on a number of projects to achieve these business 
goals, and this study is focused on analyzing their core 
software platform. The company is facing the typical problem 
of software start-ups: they need to quickly enter a competitive 
market with innovative product ideas to produce revenue in the 
near-term; simply put they need to satisfy current users and 
their expectations. At the same time, the company is facing 
the demands of growing their customer base and satisfying 
their requirements [8]. As Brightsquid’s product manager puts 
it: “The job of the start-up is to find a sustainable business 
model—in other words, to discover an important and urgent 
problem, that a defined and accessible segment of customers 
will pay for to have solved. The likelihood of finding the right 
problem and customer segment, let alone building the right 
and enduring technology solution on the first try is about 0%. 
This means that if ignored, the likelihood of architectural debt 
in a start-up is conversely 100%. Many start-ups embrace 
agile software development methodologies, where the typical 
 
1https://Brightsquid.com/ 
2HIPPA: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
attitude is that solution architecture evolves organically. Evo- 
lution is at the mercy a continually changing environment, so 
key start-up characteristics comprise survival, flexibility, 
speed, and a revolving door of opportunities, stakeholders and 
employees.” 
The paper reports on the results of a longitudinal study of 
Brightsquid’s main software platform. In this study we 
performed an architectural analysis of this platform before and 
after refactoring, with the goal of identifying and quantifying 
the architectural debt in the before and after states. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first real-world empirical study of 
architectural debt over a long period of time with the goal of 
demonstrating the benefit of improving a product’s soft- ware 
architecture by paying down architectural debt (through 
refactoring). 
Specifically this study is focused on answering three main 
research questions: 
RQ1: do quantitative measures of architecture complexity 
change significantly before/after refactoring? 
RQ2: do quantitative project quality measures change signifi- 
cantly before/after refactoring? 
RQ3: do qualitative perceptions of architectural quality change 
before/after and does this match the quantitative changes? The 
results of this longitudinal study are, we believe, quite 
dramatic. Brightsquid, by paying down its architectural debt, 
improved the maintainability of their code based significantly. 
Velocity went up significantly: the average time to resolve 
new issues in the after version went down by 72% and build 
time was reduced by over 83%, as compared with the before 
version. In addition, the number of bugs resolved per month 
nearly doubled and the lines of code required to make these 
fixes were reduced by 2/3. 
In the remainder of this paper we will describe Brightsquid’s 
business context, the details of the longitudinal analyses that 
we conducted, and the results that we obtained. 
II. CONTEXT AND BASELINE ANALYSIS 
This study has been done as part of a three year collabora- 
tive program supported by the Canadian Natural Sciences and 
Engineering Research Council (NSERC) designed to analyze 
the impact of code changes at Brightsquid. The project had 
multiple phases and was kicked off in the Summer of 2016. As 
part of this project, we studied the status of architectural debt 
and its impact on code maintainability at Brightsquid [28]. The 
timeline of this project in regards to the scope of the paper is 
presented in Figure 1. 
Inspired by the work of Begel and Zimmermann [1], in the 
initial phase of this project we performed a survey that 
included all of Brightsquid’s developers, project and product 
managers (a total of nine employees) to pinpoint the most 
interesting questions in the domain of the project. Among the 
“What areas of code / services are non-performant?” 
“What areas of the code-base are not utilized?” 
To answer these questions, we performed a preliminary 
analysis of the code for the “Platform” project which includes 
the main shared functionality of the project. We analyzed the 
code changes maintained in GITHUB and traced the changes 
to the change requests maintained on the project’s JIRA issue 
tracking system, looking into all the files and file types (Java 
and Javascript). The overview of the results is shown in 
Figure 2. We found that the 10% of the commits with the 
highest churn (changed lines of code) were applied on just 
270 files (2.5% of all files). The 25% of the commits with the 
highest churn were applied on 26.1% of the files (2,870 files). 
Our results also showed that 27.1% of the files (2,977 files) 
have never been changed after creation. And we found that 
0.4% of all the files have changed with all the change requests. 
The distribution of the churn for all the files is shown in Figure 
1 - (a). As we will show in Section V, these are all symptoms 
of architecture debt. For example, these 0.4% of files that are 
constantly changing are all members of architecture roots [23]. 
Among all the files in the Platform project, 49.1% of the 
files have only a single contributor and were never touched 
by any other person than the file creator. Looking across all 
releases and all the files that have been changed by each pair 
of non-consecutive releases showed that there is a 34% 
overlap between changed files on average. If we include also 
consecutive releases, this number goes up to 41%. In addition, 
we present a heatmap for the mutual file changes in Figure 2 
- (b). Figure 2 - (c) shows the types of issues with respect to 
code churn for the 10th percentile of the churn. 
These initial analyses led us to believe that Brightsquid’s 
code base had serious structural problems, which motivated us 
to perform an architectural analysis. 
III. ARCHITECTURAL DEBT ANALYSIS 
In our architectural analysis, we attempted to detect, mea- 
sure, and assess the consequences of architecture debt in two 
ways: 1) by calculating architecture-based maintainability 
metrics on the before and after versions of Brightsquid’s 
software, and 2) by identifying the architectural flaws and 
architecture roots in their software. 
A. Maintainability metrics suite 
We employed two state-of-the-art maintainability metrics to 
measure and compare architecture maintainability before and 
after refactoring: 
Decoupling Level (DL), introduced by Mo et al. [17]. 
Decoupling Level measures how well a software system is de- 
coupled into independent modules, using Baldwin and Clark’s 
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Fig. 2: Results of preliminary study at Brightsquid (a) churn distribution of all the files (b) Heatmap of co-changed files 
between releases (c) Type of change requests for top 10% of file with highest churn. 
 
design rule theory as the underlying theoretical foundation: 
the more active, independent, and small modules there are, the 
higher option values can be produced. Based on this rationale, 
Mo et al.’s algorithm first clusters source files into a design rule 
hierarchy (DRH), a hierarchical structure in which (1) files in 
lower layers can only depend on files in higher layers; (2) files 
within the same layer are clustered into mutually independent 
modules. Based on DRH, DL is calculated based on the design 
rule theory: the larger a module is, the lower its DL; the more 
independent modules there are, the higher the DL; the more 
dependents a module has, the lower its DL. 
Propagation Cost (PC), proposed by MacCormack et al [14] 
to measure how tightly coupled a system is. The calculation of 
PC is based on a matrix model of the dependencies among 
files. The rows and columns of the matrix are labeled with the 
files in the same order, and each nonempty cell in the matrix 
indicates an indirect or direct dependency between the file on 
the row and the file on the column. MacCormack et al.’s 
algorithm starts from the direct dependency relations among 
files in a system, and calculates the transitive closure of the 
matrix by add indirect dependencies to it until no more 
dependencies can be added. The final matrix thus contains all 
direct and indirect dependencies, PC is calculated as the 
number of nonempty cells divided by the total number of cells 
in the final matrix. PC has been used by researchers and 
practitioners to analyze large projects with similar domains 
and sizes [13]. 
These two metrics measure software from two complemen- 
tary aspects: the level of decoupling vs. the level of coupling. 
In all systems the higher the DL, and lower the PC, and vice 
versa. 
B. Architectural Flaws 
Following the work of Mo et al. [16], we detected the fol- 
lowing 6 types of architectural design flaws from Brighsquid’s 
software base: 
Clique: A group files that are interconnected, forming a 
strongly connected component. 
Package cycle: typically the package structure of a software 
system should form a hierarchical structure. A cycle among 
packages is therefore considered to be harmful. 
Improper inheritance: we consider an inheritance hierarchy 
to be problematic if it falls into one of the following cases: 
(1) a parent class depends on one or more of its children; 
(2) the client of the class hierarchy uses/calls both a parent 
and one or more of its children, thus violating the Liskov 
Substitution Principle. 
Modularity violation: properly designed modules designed 
with information hiding in mind should be able to change 
independently from each other. If two structurally indepen- 
dent modules in a DRSpace are shown to change together 
frequently in the revision history, it means that they are not 
truly independent from each other. We observe that in many 
of these cases, these modules have harmful implicit 
dependencies that should be removed. We call this flaw 
modularity violation. In this project, since the number of 
changes and co-changes are few, due to the relatively short 
revision history, we consider two files to have modularity 
violations if they have changed together at least 2 times but 
have no structural dependency on each other. 
Crossing: if a file has many dependents and depends on many 
other files, that is, having high fan-in and high fan-out, then 
this file will appear to be at the center of a cross in its DSM. 
If the file at the center also changes frequently with it 
dependents and the files it depends on, we call these files 
form a Crossing. An example crossing from Brightsquid’s 
platfom is shown in Figure 3. 
Unstable interface: if a highly influential file is changed 
frequently with other files that directly or indirectly depend 
on it, then we call it an Unstable Interface. In this project, we 
consider a file to be an unstable interface if it changes 
together with at least 5 other files two times or more. 
 
C. Architecture Roots 
Xiao et al. [23] proposed a software architecture model— 
design rule spaces (DRSpaces)—where each DRSpace models 
one aspect of a system, such as a feature, a pattern, etc. Using 
DRSpaces as an analytic lens, a software architecture can be 
viewed and analyzed as multiple overlapping DRSpaces. They 
also defined a new concept called architecture roots(or roots 
for short). These roots are the DRSpaces capturing the most 
error-prone files in a project. Dozens of studies have 
confirmed that five roots can typically cover 50% to 90% of 
the most error-prone files in a system. This implies that most 
error-prone files are usually architecturally connected; the 
more error-prone files are, the more likely that these files are 
architecturally connected so that bugs propagate through the 
connections. Following recent work [10], [18], we also 
detected the set of roots that cover at least 80% of all the error- 
prone files, before and after refactoring. By comparing the 
detected roots in the before and after versions of Brightsquid’s 
software, as well as by interviewing the practitioners, we could 
determine if these roots could pinpoint areas of the system 
most in need of refactoring. 
IV. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
A. Main Phases 
The research study commenced in June 2016. Its main ob- 
jective was to provide a methodology that we called Intelligent 
Change Management that would aid Brightsquid in responding 
more quickly to requested changes. The cornerstone of this 
strategy was to identify and pay down architectural debt so 
that the company could increase its feature-delivery and bug- 
fixing velocity. 
From the perspective of identifying and paying down ar- 
chitectural debt, and referring to Figure 1, the study was 
structured into three phases: 
1) Baseline analysis (June 2016 to May 2017.) During this 
time the data and key findings from Phase 1, as described 
in Section II, were collected and analyzed. These findings 
served as a strong motivation for the company to look more 
deeply into technical debt and its root causes and a decision 
was made to analyze the root causes of architecture debt. 
2) Architectural analysis before refactoring. (July 2017.) At 
this time an in-depth architectural analysis was performed. 
The key attributes studied in this architectural debt analysis 
were those described in Section III: we captured DL and 
PC scores, we calculated the architecture roots, and we 
calculated the architecture flaws. 
3) Refactoring and repeated architectural debt analysis. 
(January to August 2018.) During this period, given the 
results from Phase 2, an extensive architectural refactoring 
was undertaken by Brightsquid. The refactoring done in 
Phase 3 served multiple purposes: (i) reducing the technical 
(architectural) debt that had accumulated over time, (ii) 
adding new functionality in response to major emergent 
customer requirements, and (iii) fixing bugs. This process 
included purging of packages, consolidating tightly coupled 
functionality together, cleaning up inheritance structures, 
and purging complex and obsolete business logic that had 
accumulated over the years. 
 
B. The Process of Architectural Debt Analysis 
To assess if and how the refactoring activity had affected the 
architecture, and, most importantly, the maintainability of the 
architecture, we conducted both quantitative and qualitative 
analyses. For the qualitative analysis, which is independent of 
the architectural debt analysis, we conducted a survey and 
multiple interviews to collect practitioner opinion and 
experience so that we could better understand the implications 
and outcomes of the refactoring activity. For example, we 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: A Design Structure Matrix with a Crossing Flaw (highlighted) 
wanted to learn if the Brightsquid developers feel that it has 
become easier to maintain the system after refactoring, and if 
they thought that the 3 months of refactoring was worthwhile. 
For quantitative analysis, we analyzed two versions of the 
system—before and after refactoring—as well as 6 months of 
revision history after each of these versions. In both 
analyses, we employed DV83—a commercial version of the 
Titan architectural analysis tool suite [23], [24]—to analyze 
the architecture of each system version to assess architecture 
debt. To support this analysis we collected project history data, 
including issue records and git logs, so that we could quan- 
titatively measure how maintenance activities have changed 
before and after refactoring. 
Since the refactoring began on January 8th, 2018, for the 
before-refactoring analysis we analyzed the evolution history 
of the system 6 months prior to January 8th, and used a release 
in July 2017 as the target subject for architecture analysis of 
the “before” state. The refactoring was completed by March 
1st, 2018. We analyzed the version released on that date, and 6 
months of project history after that date, to assess the impacts 
of the refactoring. 
For each of these two snapshots, we used DV8 to analyze 
the architecture from the three aspects elaborated in the 
previous section, collecting: 1) DL and PC scores, 2) the 
number of instances of architecture flaws and their scopes, 
and 3) the instances of architectural roots and their scopes. In 
particular, we were keen to know if the architectural problems 
we identified in the “before” state had been resolved during 
the refactoring process and if new problems emerged after 
refactoring. The output of this analysis will allow us to answer 
RQ1. 
For these two periods of history, in addition to counting the 
total numbers of issues opened and fixed and the numbers of 
bug issues opened and fixed, we also calculated the LOC spent 
to fix each bug. We also counted the average numbers of days 
required for bugs to be fixed in the before and after versions. 
Our rationale for these measures is that if the architectural 
refactoring was successful it would become easier for 
developers to find and fix bugs and to develop new features. In 
this case the time and LOC spent should be significantly 
shortened after refactoring. The output of this analysis will 
allow us to answer RQ2. 
 
V. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Now we present our results, organized according to the re- 
search questions stated in Section I. The first research question 
RQ1: do quantitative measures of 
architecture debt change significantly 
before/after refactoring? 
We summarize architecture measures and debts in Table I 
and Table II. 
After refactoring, the size of the code files shrunk by 41.5% 
while we found only three roots (containing 296 Files) that 
collectively account for 80% of bug fixes. By contrast there 
were five roots (including 295 files) before refactoring. In 
total, 37% of the files covered 80% of the bugs after 
refactoring while the number was 17% before the refactoring. 
After comparing these roots, we realize that some of the roots 
remain in the after version, meaning that the focal points of the 
system are centered around these 296 files, which could be 
determined by the nature of the application. Here we observe 
that the Pareto rule applies for architectural debt: the top few 
architectural roots always count for about 80% of the bugs, 
either before or after refactoring. 
Analysis of the decoupling level showed that the modularity 
of the system decreased slightly, as the DL score reduced by 
3%, and the PC score remained the same, at 6%. The small 
difference of DL could be caused by the fact that many 
redundant components (which may be independent, and 
contributed to a higher DL) were removed during the 
refactoring. But a difference of 3% is essentially noise. 
These system-wide measures—the DL/PC scores, as well as 
the root analysis—do not reflect the changes in architecture 
directly. These are overall average health measures. But in 
architectural health the architectural flaws, which provide a 
more fine-grained analysis of architecture, changed drastically. 
To make an analogy, a human might be mostly healthy— 
having good blood pressure, low cholesterol, proper kidney 
function, etc.—but a brain tumor can undermine and render 
irrelevant all of those other measures. 
 
TABLE I: Architectural analysis before and after refactoring. 
 
  General information Before After  
# of files 1713 711 
# of roots covering 80% of bugs 5 3 
# of files in roots covering 80% of bugs 296 295 
# of files covering 80% of bugs 17% 37% 
Architectural Metrics Before After 
Decoupling level 86% 83% 
 Propagation cost 6% 6%  
Architectural flaws Before After # of cliques 
aims to quantitatively measure changes in architectural debts # of files influenced by cliques 17 10 71 26 
as reflected in Brightsquid’s source code; the second question 
aims to quantitatively measure changes in maintainability and 
productivity outcomes as reflected in revision history; and the 
third research question explores the experiences from the 
developers and assess if the objective numbers match 
developers’ experiences and intuitions. 
 
3http://www.archdia.net 
# of unhealthy inheritance 60 30 
# of files influenced by unhealthy inheritance 222 102 
# of unstable interface 12 8 
# of files influenced by unstable interface 471 59 
 # of files influenced by package cycles 242 94  
# of crossings 29 6 
# of files influenced by crossings 387 47 
# of package cycles 34 19 
Concretely, the number of cliques was reduced by 41.1% as 
the # of files impacted by them were reduced by 63.3%. Both 
the number of unhealthy inheritances as well as the number of 
files affected by them reduced by almost 50%. The number of 
unstable interfaces was reduced from 12 to 8, and the number 
of files influenced by these interfaces reduced by 54%. The 
79.3% reduction in the number of crossings was accompanied 
by a 87.8% reduction in the number of files impacted by the 
crossings. Finally, the number of package cycles reduced by 
44.1% which shrunk the number of impacted files by 61.1%. 
Since the file names changed drastically before and after 
refactoring, it is impossible to compare the changes in terms of 
modularity violation instances. The comparative results are 
shown in Table I. 
Why should we care about reducing flaws? Let us consider a 
specific example: the crossing shown in Figure 3. This crossing 
is centered around the file “User.java”. In the before state of the 
system User.java was the center of a crossing containing 107 
files. That is, in the before state, 106 other files either depended 
on User.java, or User.java depended on them. If User.java 
changed frequently—and it did—then many other files were 
potentially affected. In the after state, just 35 other files are 
coupled with User.java. This kind of reduction in complexity 
that we achieve by paying down the debt associated with 
architectural flaws means that, in general, changes are less 
likely to “ripple” to other files which in turn reduces the cost 
and complexity of those changes. 
The refactoring activities were recorded as 106 change 
requests, which resulted in an effort of 563.8 person hours. We 
linked these refactoring issues to the commits that were related 
to 7 cliques, 23 crossings, and 4 unstable interfaces that we 
detected from architectural debt analysis before refactoring. 
We found that about 34% of the commits, 28% of the time, 
and 37% of lines of code during the refactoring period were 
related to the removal of architectural debt. 
We looked into the time to fix issues in the files related to 
the refactored cliques, crossings, and unstable interfaces. We 
could find 13 issues after refactoring and compared them with 
the 51 issues related to these files before refactoring. Our 
comparison showed that the average time to close the issues 
relate to these critical files dropped by 72%. 
 
 
RQ2: do quantitative project quality 
measures change significantly before/after 
refactoring? 
If the refactoring was successful, it should become easier 
for developers to add features or fix bugs. Here we use two 
proxies to quantify the ease of performing maintenance 
activities: 
(1) # churn (lines of code changed) per issue. The rationale 
here is that the easier it is to fix a bug or to add new features, 
the fewer LOC will be needed to close a change request. If we 
only consider bug issues: the average bug-fixing churn after 
refactoring is about 34 LOC per issue on average, compared to 
102 LOC before refactoring. It appears, and the development 
team believed, that the improved architecture made bug-fixing 
substantially more efficient. If we consider all issue types, and 
not just bugs, the averages are still improved: 208 LOC before 
refactoring and 156 after refactoring. 
(2) # days needed per issue. The rationale here is that the 
easier it is to fix a bug or to add new features, the less time 
needed to close a change request. The data shows that the 
average bug-fixing duration reduced 30%, dropping from 10 
days before to 7 days after. The productivity of the team 
improved from both reduced build time and reduced bug-fixing 
duration. The box plot distribution of the time spent to close a 
change request before and after refactoring and the churn are 
shown in Figure 4. 
We also observed that before refactoring, 71 change requests 
(including 24 bug reports), involving code changes in the 
platform were resolved in five months, compared to 150 
change requests (including 78 bug issues) after refactoring in 
a similar five month period. These numbers indicate that— 
with the same size team—after refactoring more issues are 
addressed and less code is “spent” to address each issue. 
 
 
So far these quantitative analyses indicate a very successful 
refactoring activity, both reflected in the record of revision his- 
tory and in the significant reduction of architectural flaws. Next 
we assess if the numbers match the developers’ intuitions. 
 
RQ3:do qualitative perceptions of 
architectural quality change before/after 
and does this match the quantitative 
changes? 
To collect feedback from the development team, we con- 
ducted a structured interview. The goal of this interview was 
to qualitatively assess the perceived impact of refactoring. We 
wanted to understand if maintaining the system became 
noticeably better, in terms of bug-fixing and productivity. And 
 
TABLE II: Maintainability measures of Brightsquid’s projects 
before and after refactoring. 
 
Measure Before After 
# of files 1713 711 
# of issues opened 680 843 
# of issues fixed 583 653 
# of bugs opened 157 310 
# of bugs fixed 137 267 
# of bugs that changed code in platform files 24 78 
Amount of churn per bug 102 33.9 
 Average bug fixing time 10.74 7.31  
The time and lines of code needed to close change re- quests 
are significantly lower than the required time before 
refactoring (p-value = 0.001 and 0.002). Considering these 
measures as proxies for productivity, it appears that the anal- 
ysis of architectural debt correctly directed the architectural 
refactoring to increase developer productivity. 
The average time needed to close issues before and after 
refactoring was reduced by 72%. 
we wanted to understand how much the developers thought 
that these improvements were triggered by the results of the 
Phase 2 analysis. To do this we interviewed key project stake- 
holders. The product manager, architect, and two back-end 
developers participated in the interview. Below, we first discuss 
the structured interview results, along with the descriptions 
provided by the participants, and then summarize the results of 
the follow-on unstructured interview. 
All participants were asked seven yes-no questions, where 
they were also given the opportunity to add some elaborations 
on their reasons for the answers given. The product manager, 
software architect, and two back-end developers attended this 
interview. We asked them to consider all the questions in terms 
of the system state six months before and six months after 
refactoring. 
While our quantitative results showed that “the # of change 
request opened before refactoring is less than the # of change 
requests opened after refactoring” in Brightsquid, the product 
manager and a developer considered this a misleading char- 
acterization. The product manager argued that intuitively this 
seemed wrong as after refactoring the architecture and business 
rules were simplified and having less code, tables, and tests 
should result in fewer issues. The architect attributed the main 
cause of this increase to the introduction of new features. 
When comparing the status of change requests before and after 
refactoring, all the participants agreed with our finding that 
“the portion of fixed change requests is higher after 
refactoring.” The implication is that a desirable outcome had 
been achieved: more features were able to be added (with the 
same team size) after refactoring. 
One of the surprising results was that “the number of bugs 
opened after refactoring is significantly more than the number 
of bugs before.” The software architect considered this to be 
consistent with his own perception. He stated that adding a 
large amount of new functionality caused a lot of new bugs in 
the short term, while the old functionality was fairly stable. 
This finding is also consistent with other studies of 
refactoring: bugs often go up in the short term as the new, 
refactored functionality is being integrated and debugged, but 
this is not a long-term phenomenon [11]. All the participants 
confirmed our finding that the ratio of fixed bugs to open bugs 
 
 
Fig. 4: Analysis of change requests before and after refactor- 
ing: Time spent (left) and size of change (right) 
was higher after refactoring (in comparison to before). This 
effect was caused by two related factors: the refactoring both 
reduced code dependencies and increased productivity. The 
participants also confirmed our finding that “the time needed 
to fix a bug after refactoring is less than the time needed 
before refactoring”. This was again believe to be the case 
because the refactoring reduced dependencies, and so bugs 
were more localized. But the increase in bug-fixing velocity 
was also aided by the fact that creating the builds became 
83.3% faster after refactoring. 
When it comes to validating our findings regarding the 
amount of changes, all participants agreed that “the number of 
files changed per bug is significantly less after refactoring” 
and “the number of lines of code to change (churn) per bug is 
significantly less after refactoring.” These values were 
significantly higher before the refactoring and, once again, this 
was attributed to the higher code complexity and higher inter- 
file dependencies in the before version. 
We wrap up our discussion of our qualitative analysis with a 
quotation from the Brightsquid’s senior architect: 
 
 
In addition to comparing our results with the perception of 
developers in previous subsection, we performed semi- 
structured interviews with two key actors in the company: the 
product manager and the chief architect. Below we present 
each of the questions accompanied by the consolidated results 
of the interview discussions we had with these Brightsquid 
managers. 
Q: How did you use the report from Phase 2 to decide 
if/when/how/where to re-factor? 
“We used the report to confirm our own hypotheses on 
technical debt issues, including circular relationships in our 
code base. 
We did not use specific report findings to determine where we 
should focus our attention. Instead, there were product and 
feature changes that drove our decisions regarding code, files 
and tables to deprecate and/or re-factor.” 
Q: To what extend did the report guide you to scrutinize parts 
or aspects of the architecture that you might not have 
otherwise focused on? 
The team had a general understanding of the architectural 
issues inherent in the code base. Business decisions regarding 
product and feature deprecation drove decisions more than the 
report. 
Q: Did the results of architectural debt analysis affect your 
priorities? 
Confirmation and quantification of technical debt through the 
report made a stronger business case to focus more of the 
technical teams time on overtly addressing technical debt. 
Q: Did the results of architectural debt analysis affect your 
“Having an architectural debt analysis report that goes 
through coupling, circular relationships, and dependencies 
confirmed our hypotheses and we were able to convey to the 
top management that we need to do the refactoring as quick 
as possible.” 
“Our code base was a historical record of our quest to find 
the right market, problem and solution. Architectural debt 
analysis quantitatively exposed how and where this inflated 
our cost of change.” 
refactoring strategies? 
Because of the sheer amount of technical debt, and business 
decisions made based on feature and product changes, the team 
determined refactoring strategies without refering to the report. 
Q: Did the report highlight any problems that were not already 
known/obvious to team members? 
The team was generally aware of the technical debt issues in 
our code base. The report was very helpful in overtly 
quantifying the amount and extent of actual technical debt. 
Q: Do you think there is a positive return-on-investment from 
running architectural debt analysis and the return you received 
out of it? 
Very much so. Return-on-Investment includes (i) Faster builds: 
over 50% reduction in building code and (ii) Reduction in 
files, schemes and tables resulted in simplified architecture. 
Consequently less time is required to design, write code, test, 
build and maintain product and features. 
Q: What do you think had the biggest impact from running the 
debt analysis? 
By confirming both the level and extent of technical debt, it 
was easier to acquire business commitment to address 
technical debt through a more cohesive rather than piecemeal 
approach. 
Q: What would have happened without it? 
In the absence of the report, we would have been more likely 
to address technical debt in a piecemeal fashion, and dragged 
this out over a longer period of time. 
As a typical software project that has evolved for years, 
most maintenance costs in the Brightsquid Platform have been 
focused on just a few file groups, as shown in the Architectural 
Root analysis. These Roots are typically the root causes of 
much of the projects technical debt. All after all, as the 
Brightsquid manager said: 
 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Studying a software organizations efforts for improvement 
over time allows us to better understand its impact on success 
[7]. In our longitudinal study, we have covered a period of two 
years. Any realistic organization does not provide controlled 
settings, and the same was true for our longitudinal study. A 
multitude of changes related to resources, development, and 
business goals occurred concurrently. The impact of such 
changes is even more substantial for smaller start-up com- 
panies such as Brightsquid. Consequently, no strict causality 
statements can be made. Nevertheless, by triangulating all of 
the evidence that we collected, a coherent picture emerges. We 
argue that the architecture debt analysis that we performed had 
a strong impact on company’s decision-makers and this caused 
them to decide to refactor and guided them in how to focus 
their refactoring efforts. This refactoring, in turn, helped give 
the company the ability to mature their technology and better 
adjust to the competitive health care market. 
Refactoring and removing technical debt are a priority and 
an ongoing effort for Brightsquid, but these needed to be 
balanced against the business’s other priorities—delivering 
customer-facing features. The Brightsquid stakeholders have 
seen, however, the significant benefits to the business and the 
development team in reducing complexity, removing architec- 
tural flaws, and simplifying or removing obsolete business 
rules. The refactoring efforts helped to increase Brightsquid 
team’s productivity and ability to adapt quickly to new busi- 
ness requirements. 
We argue that the overall message presented in this paper— 
that architecture debt was weighing Brightsquid down and that 
the refactoring removed substantial portions of this debt— is 
the result of combining various independent streams of 
reasoning and evidence: 
1) Quantitative analysis: This analysis revealed improve- 
ments to both the architecture and the maintainability of the 
platform software. This analysis was based on measur- ing 
key attributes of the system’s software architecture— its 
complexity and architecture flaws and roots—and key 
outcome measures, such as lines of code, bugs, and velocity. 
Our study was limited to Brightsquid’s platform project and 
focused on its Java code, but this was justifiable as the 
platform is the most critical software component for the 
company. Still, a more comprehensive analysis including 
other parts of the system, is needed to increase the validity 
of our findings. 
2) Qualitative analysis: This evidence was based on per- 
forming a series of interviews with key members of the 
project team, asking for their perceptions surrounding the 
relevance, utility, and accuracy of the architectural debt 
analysis. This allowed us to assess the perceived value of 
the analyses that we performed. Even though we had just 
four participants, the clear trend was that the architectural 
analysis confirmed our hypotheses and gave Brightsquid 
the evidence that they needed for their decision making. In 
addition, the analysis allowed the team to argue for the 
urgency of performing a substantial refactoring. While these 
forms of interviews are subject to validity threats, when 
combined with the quantitative results a consistent picture 
emerges. 
3) Preponderance of evidence: Finally, we argue that the re- 
sults achieved here, in terms of the reduction in architectural 
flaws and the subsequent gains in productivity, are consis- 
tent with a large and growing body of research evidence— 
that technical and architectural debt matters and paying it 
down can catalyze substantial productivity improvements 
(e.g. [2], [3], [5], [16], [21]). The value and insight gained 
from running architectural debt analyses has been shown in 
other studies. In particular it has been shown that the 
number of architectural flaws per file is very strongly 
correlated with bugs, changes, and churn/effort [6], [16]. In 
this study, for the first time, we performed multiple analyses 
of a single system over time. In particular, we measure the 
architectural debt and productivty measures before and after 
refactoring. 
Thus while we can not argue for strict causality—that the 
refactoring caused the productivity improvements—all of the 
available evidence—qualitative, quantitative, and our prior 
research corpus of results—points in the same direction. This 
gives us confidence in arguing that reducing architectural debt 
has an influence on productivity and quality measures that 
projects care about. 
Having seen the value of this analysis, Brightsquid is now 
considering embarking on a program of continuous 
architecture measurement and benchmarking. Measurement, 
particularly if it is fully automated and connected with project 
triggers (for example, a nightly build), can quickly notify 
project stakeholders if there has been a degradation in the 
architecture—perhaps the introduction of a new architecture 
flaw. Benchmarking can help a company understand how it is 
situated in terms of its competitive landscape. So, for example, 
a company can track its DL score over time and use this to 
determine if any mitigations are required. This is no different 
than what you do when you go to the doctor. The doctor 
analyzes your health via a spectrum of analyses and tests and 
notes differences from your last checkup (for example, a 
dramatic increase in blood pressure or cholesterol levels) and 
uses broad benchmarks to decide if an intervention is 
necessary (for example, a total cholesterol level of 220 is 
slightly high but within the normal range for adults). All of 
the architectural analyses presented in this paper are fully 
automated and so they can provide exactly the data needed for 
such measurement and benchmarking (e.g. [17]). 
VII. RELATED WORK 
In this section, we consider previous work related to our 
case study. 
Architectural Debt Analysis. In the past decade, a number of 
methods have been proposed to analyze technical debt [4], 
[26], [27] within software systems. DV8 and Titan have been 
used to analyze and detect architectural debt in both open 
source and (closed source) industrial projects. Kazman et. al. 
[10] presented the experiences of detecting and quanti- fying 
architectural debts in Softserve, as well as a return on 
investment estimation of the benefit that would accrue to 
potential refactoring activities. The recent work of Mo et al 
[18] reported the experience of applying the DV8 tool suite to 
eight projects of various sizes and domains within ABB 
Corporation, and showed that the architecture analysis helped 
practitioners to make decisions on if and where to refactor. 
Carriere et. al. [3] also proposed and applied a cost- benefit 
model to estimate benefits of reducing the level of coupling in 
an e-conmerce architecture. Their work focused on coupling 
only, rather than on identifying architecture flaws and 
pinpointing the locations to refactor. 
Curtis et. al. [5] proposed a model to estimate the amount 
technical debt in terms of cost calculated from source code 
static relations. Nord et. al. [21] created a formula to estimate 
the impact of technical debt on architecture, which could be 
used to optimize long-term product evolution. Similarly to 
Curtis et. al., their work does not detect the location and 
specific problems that need to be treated. 
Martini and Bosch [15] proposed and validated AnaCon- 
Debt, a method that has been applied to 12 case systems 
within 6 companies. Their experience showed that it can help 
practitioners to decide if and when to refactor architectural 
debt items. Different from Titan and DV8, the architectural 
debt in their work had to be manually identified beforehand by 
architects. 
Of all these previous cases studies, none of them pre- 
sented the experiences before and after the actual refactoring 
activities, although many of them demonstrated that their 
approaches can help the team to make refactoring decisions. 
The work we are presenting here is, to our knowledge, the first 
report of analyzing a system before and after refactoring, in 
terms of architecture debt variations and maintenance effort 
variations, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
 
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As described by Runeson et al. [22], case studies in 
software engineering are often just examining small-scale 
systems with relatively low research effort. There is a lack of 
longitudinal case study research (with some notable exceptions 
such as [12]) which are particularly appropriate for larger 
scale, complex phenomena where there is a need to collect 
both quantitative and qualitative data. As mentioned by [22], 
“software engineering research community both recognizes the 
demands of longitudinal case study research but also that the 
community can only rarely allocate sufficient resources toward 
such studies”. 
Our current study covers a period of two years and reports 
on the process and major findings from identifying and paying 
down architectural debt. In this study we have observed 
substantial improvements made over the period of intervention 
and analysis. Understanding the architectural flaws and initiat- 
ing refactoring helped the company to reduce their build time 
by about 83%, reduced the average time to resolve issues by 
72%, and reduce bug-fixing effort from an average of 102 LOC 
per bug to just 34. How do we know that these improvements 
all accrued to the architectural debt repayment? We can not 
claim causality, of course, based on a single case study. 
However, we can make an argument based on a preponderance 
of evidence all pointing in the same direction. The number and 
size of the architecture flaws went down, productivity 
measures went up, the key stakeholders felt that the refactoring 
benefited their ability to manage the code base. And, finally, 
all of this is consistent with the evidence collected over the 
analyses of hundreds of open source and industrial projects in 
our prior work which shows a very strong correlation between 
architectural flaws and productivity measures [6], [16]. Thus, 
although this is just a single case study, it presents a consistent 
picture—that architectural debt matters and that it is possible 
to pay it down, via refactoring, and achieve significant benefits 
as a result. 
Many start-ups embrace agile software development 
methodologies, where the typical attitude is that solution 
architecture evolves organically. Evolution is at the mercy a 
continually changing environment, so key start-up characteris- 
tics comprise survival, flexibility, speed, and a revolving door 
of opportunities, stakeholders and employees. The research 
presented here is part of a long term project with BrightSquid 
to improve their software processes. For example we devel- 
oped ESSMArT for automatic escalation and summarization 
of user requests [19] and implemented a tagging method for 
better estimation of effort needed to close a change request 
[20]. The research reported here is a second major step towards 
our goal of Intelligent Change Management. 
The job of the start-up is to find a sustainable business 
model—in other words, to discover an important and urgent 
problem, that a defined and accessible segment of customers 
will pay for. But this often seems to be inherently in conflict 
with a disciplined approach towards software engineering in 
general and with the management of technical debt in 
particular. The final outcome of this study is that it made 
believers out of Brightsquid’s management. Thus we will 
conclude with a quotation from the product owner. 
“The approach expressed in the paper to analyze architec- 
tural debt provides immutable guide-stones to navigate through 
the mutable destinations on the road to discovering the actual 
sustainable business model. If we declare the components of 
your analysis to be essential non-functional requirements 
(clique, package cycle, improper inheritance, modularity viola- 
tion, crossing, unstable interface) with overtly declared targets, 
then regardless of the markets, problems or solutions visited 
on the journey, the disciplined start-up that regularly manages 
these non-functional requirements is much better equipped to 
avoid architectural debt accumulation in the first place. As 
long as acceptable thresholds are maintained, the start-up can 
be confident that the architecture supports, rather than thwarts 
success. Quick and dirty fixes can consequently be exposed as 
what they truly are - incremental, short-sighted steps down a 
slippery slope that inflates the costs of change. In short, An 
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” 
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